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What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act |
Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets
XI ALICE GAO, Harvard University
JIE ZHANG, Aarhus University
YILING CHEN, Harvard University
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future event
of interest. How well this goal is achieved depends on self-interested market participants, whose behav-
iors are crucially inuenced by not only their private information but also the relationship among their
information, in other words, the information structure of market participants. In this paper, we model
a prediction market using the now-classic logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker as an
extensive-form Bayesian game and aim to understand and characterize the game-theoretic equilibria of the
market for dierent information structures. Prior work has shown that when participants' information is
independent conditioned on the realized outcome of the event, the only type of equilibria in this setting
has every participant race to honestly reveal their private information as soon as possible, which is the
most desirable outcome for the market for information aggregation. This paper considers the remaining two
classes of information structures: participants' information being unconditionally independent (the I game)
and participants' information being both conditionally and unconditionally dependent (the D game). We
characterize the unique family of equilibria for the I game with nite number of participants and nite
stages. At any equilibrium in this family, if player i's last stage of participation in the market is after player
j's, player i only reveals his information after player j's last stage of participation. This suggests that players
race to delay the information revelation, which is probably the least desirable outcome for the market's goal.
We consider a special case of the D game and provide insights on what equilibria may look like if one exists.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms: Economics, Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Information loss, manipulation, prediction market
1. INTRODUCTION
A prediction market for forecasting a random event allows market participants to express
their probability assessments for possible outcomes of the event, typically by trading -
nancial securities, and to be compensated if their assessments are more accurate than the
previous market assessment. Participants thus have an economic incentive to improve the
accuracy of the market assessment, and hence revealing their information. Moreover, by
observing activities of other participants, a rational participant can infer some informa-
tion from their activities and combine such information with his private information when
trading in the market. Prediction markets rely on the economic incentives provided by the
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mechanism and the belief updating of participants to achieve their primary goal of eliciting
and aggregating information about uncertain events of interest.
To this end, arguably we desire that participants reveal their private information truthfully
and immediately in prediction markets. However, how well the information elicitation and
aggregation goal is achieved depends on the strategic behavior of the self-interested market
participants, which in turn is inuenced by their private information and their knowledge
of others' private information, what we formally call information structure of participants.
In this paper, we model a prediction market as an extensive-form Bayesian game where
each participant has a private signal and there is a joint distribution of the participants'
signals and the event outcome, which is common knowledge to all participants. This joint
distribution captures what participants know about each other's private information and
is the information structure of the market game. The goal of this work is to understand
and characterize game-theoretic equilibria of this market game given dierent information
structures, with the hope to understand how and how quickly information is aggregated in
the market.
Our prediction market uses Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [Hanson
2007], which is the de facto automated market maker mechanism for prediction markets.
Because participants interact with the market maker, which is the mechanism per se and is
deterministic, we only need to model the participant side of the markets, which makes the
generally challenging equilibrium analysis for extensive-form Bayesian games tractable for
some information structures in our setting.
Prior work [Chen et al. 2007b, 2010] has shown that when participants' information is
independent conditioned on the true outcome of the event, the only type of equilibria in
this setting has every participant race to truthfully reveal all their information as soon as
possible, which is the most desirable outcome for the market's goal. This paper considers
the remaining two classes of information structures: participants' information being uncon-
ditionally independent (the I game) and participants' information being both conditionally
and unconditionally dependent (the D game).
Our technical contributions include: (1) We characterize the unique family of equilibria
for the I game with nite number of participants and nite stages. At any equilibrium
in this family, if player i's last stage of participation in the market is after player j's,
player i only reveals his information after player j's last stage of participation and on or
before his own last stage of participation. This suggests that participants race to delay
the information revelation, which is probably the least desirable outcome for the market's
goal and is in sharp contrast to the equilibria when participants' information is conditionally
independent. (2) While it is generally challenging to characterize equilibria of extensive-form
Bayesian games, we provide a systematic method for nding possible equilibrium strategies
in a restricted 3-stage market game. With this method, we examine a restricted D game,
where the information structure does not appear to have any characteristics that we can
leverage, and are able to cast insights on what the equilibria may look like if one exists. We
also show that there exist D games that admit truthful equilibria.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in
Section 1.1. Section 2 introduces our formal model of a prediction market game. We focus on
a 3-stage market game with general information structures in Section 3, where we show how
to more succinctly describe an equilibrium of the market game and provide a systematic
method of nding possible equilibrium strategies of the game. Results in this section are
building blocks for our subsequent analysis. In Section 4, we characterized all equilibria
of the I game. Section 5 provides an exploration on what equilibria of the D game may
look like if one exists and demonstrates the existence of a truthful equilibrium for some
information structures of this class. We conclude in Section 6. Due to lack of space, the
omitted proofs are provided in the appendix of the full paper, which will be available on
the authors' websites.Proceedings Article
1.1. Related Work
We model a prediction market as an extensive-form Bayesian game as in prior work [Chen
et al. 2007b; Dimitrov and Sami 2007; Chen et al. 2010; Ostrovsky 2012]. Chen et al.
[2010] considered both a nite-stage, nite-player and an innite-stage, innite-player mar-
ket game. They showed that when players' information is independent conditioned on the
true state of the world, for both the nite- and innite-stage games, there is a unique type
of PBE, where players reveal their information truthfully and as soon as they can. When
players' information is (unconditionally) independent, they proved that the truthful play is
not an equilibrium for both the nite- and innite-stage games. An earlier work [Nikolova
and Sami 2007] also presented an instance in which the truthful strategy is not optimal in
an extensive-form game based on this market. However, whether a PBE exists when players
have independent information was left as an open question. In this paper, we characterize all
PBE of the nite-stage game with independent information and explore a special case of the
setting when players' information is neither conditionally nor unconditionally independent.
Instead of characterizing equilibria, Ostrovsky [2012] studied whether information is fully
aggregated in the limit at a PBE of an innite-stage, nite-player market game with risk-
neutral players. He characterized a condition under which the market price of a security
converges to its expected value conditioned on all information with probability 1 at any
PBE. Iyer et al. [2010] extended the setting for risk-averse players and characterized the
condition for full information aggregation in the limit at any PBE. However, whether a PBE
exists in such market games remains an open question.
The 3-stage version of our prediction market model resembles the ones studied by Dim-
itrov and Sami [2010] and Chen et al. [2011]: they both study 2-player games and the rst
player has another chance of participation after the second player's turn in the game. How-
ever, both Dimitrov and Sami [2010] and Chen et al. [2011] consider that the rst player
has utility for some event outside of the current market and the price in the current market
inuences the outcome of this event. In this paper, players only derive utilities from their
trades in the market.
Jian and Sami [2010] studied market scoring rule prediction markets in a laboratory
setting. In their experiment, participants may have conditionally or unconditionally inde-
pendent information and the trading sequence may or may not be structured (i.e. when the
trading sequence is common knowledge). They conrmed previous theoretical predictions of
the strategic behavior by Chen et al. [2010] when the trading sequence is structured. This
study suggests that the behavior of participants in a prediction market critically depends on
whether they reason about the other participants' private information. Moreover, there are
some experimental and empirical studies on price manipulation in prediction markets using
double auction mechanisms. The results are mixed, some giving evidence for the success
of price manipulation [Hansen et al. 2004] and others showing the robustness of prediction
markets to price manipulation [Camerer 1998; Hanson et al. 2007; Rhode and Strumpf 2004,
2007]. In the literature on nancial markets, participants have been shown to manipulate
market prices [Allen and Gale 1992; Chakraborty and Yilmaz 2004; Kumar and Seppi 1992].
2. MODEL OF THE MARKET GAME
We model a prediction market using an automated market maker mechanism as a Bayesian
extensive-form game. Our setting is similar to that of these prior work [Chen et al. 2010,
2007b; Dimitrov and Sami 2007].
The prediction market generates forecasts for a binary event with the outcome space

 = fY;Ng. Let ! 2 
 denote the realized outcome of this event. Many real-world prediction
markets focus on such binary events, for example \whether the UK economy will go into
recession in 2013", \whether the movie Lincoln will win the Academy Award for Best
Picture", and \whether a Democrat will win the US Presidential election in 2016".Proceedings Article
2.1. Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule
The prediction market operates using a logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [Hanson
2007], which is arguably the de facto automated market maker mechanism for prediction
markets. In practice, an LMSR market often oers one contract for each outcome that
pays o $1 if the corresponding outcome happens. The market maker (i.e. the mechanism)
dynamically adjusts the contracts' prices as traders buy and sell the contracts. However, it is
well known that this implementation is equivalent to a more abstract model where, instead
of trading contracts and changing market prices, traders simply report probability estimates
of event outcomes to the mechanism. In fact, Hanson [2007] introduced LMSR using this
abstract model. In what follows, we will describe LMSR for our setting as a mechanism for
changing probability estimates. Abstracting away the contracts makes subsequent analyses
more tractable. We refer interested readers to Chen and Pennock [2007] and Abernethy
et al. [2013] for more information on the equivalence of the two models.
An LMSR prediction market starts with some initial probability estimate r0 for event
outcome Y . (For a binary event, the probability of outcome N is implicitly 1   r0, and
such logic holds in the rest of the paper.) Players participate in the market in sequence
and each player can change the current probability estimate to a new one of his choice.
The market closes at a predened time. After that, the realized outcome ! is observed and
players receive their payos.
If a player reports estimate rt when the current market estimate is rt 1, his payo for this
report rt is the scoring rule dierence, s(!;rt) s(!;rt 1), where s(!;r) is the logarithmic
scoring rule
s(!;r) =

blog(r); if ! = Y
blog(1   r); if ! = N,
and b is a parameter. A player may participate in the market multiple times. If Ti denotes
the set of stages where player i participates, then player i's total payo is the sum of the
payo for each of his reports,
P
t2Ti(s(!;rt)   s(!;rt 1)): We assume b = 1 without loss
of generality, since b scales each player's payo and does not have any eect on the players'
strategic behaviors in our setting.
The logarithmic scoring rule is one of many strictly proper scoring rules. All strictly proper
scoring rules share a nice incentive property: q = argmaxr(q s(Y;r) + (1   q)s(N;r)). If
a player is paid by a strictly scoring rule, then his expected score is uniquely maximized
by honestly reporting his probability estimate. As a result, for a single report rt, a risk-
neutral player can maximize his expected payo in an LMSR market by honestly reporting
his probability estimate, because rt 1 is xed for this player. However, if the player can
participate multiple times, then to maximize his total payo, he may misreport his estimate
in order to mislead other players and capitalize on their mistakes later on.
2.2. The Finite-Stage Market Game
The market game we study is an LMSR market with n stages and m  n players. The players
participates in one or more stages of the market game, following a pre-dened sequence,
which is common knowledge1.
Each player i's has private information about the event given by a private signal si 2 Si
with signal space Si and jSij = ni. Each signal is only observed by the intended player.
The prior distribution of the event outcomes and the players' private signals, denoted by
1It is an interesting future direction to consider a dierent market game where players endogenously choose
when to participate. However, our equilibrium results for the market game with a pre-dened participation
order imply that players will delay information revelation as much as possible in the market game with
endogenously chosen participation order. We discuss these implications in section 4 after our equilibrium
results.Proceedings Article
P : 
  S1    Sm ! [0;1], is common knowledge. Before the market starts, nature
draws the realized event outcome and the private signals of the players according to P.
The players are risk-neutral Bayesian agents. That is, the belief of the player participating
in stage t can depend on the reported estimates in the rst t   1 stages as well as on his
own private signal.
The 3-Stage Market Game. The simplest version of the market game that admits non-
trivial strategic play is a 2-player 3-stage game. The two players are Alice and Bob, and the
sequence of participation is Alice, Bob, and then Alice. We denote the signal spaces of Alice
and Bob as SA = fai : 0  i  nA  1;nA 2 Z+g and SB = fbj : 0  j  nB  1;nB 2 Z+g
respectively. The analysis of this 3-stage market game will serve as building blocks for our
analysis of the nite-stage market game.
2.3. Information Structure
The prior distribution P is a critical component of each instance of the market game. It
encodes the relationship between the players' private signals and the event outcome, and it
enables players with private signals to reason about other players' signals and the realized
event outcome. We refer to P alternatively as the \information structure" of the market
game. The primary goal of this paper is to characterize the strategic play in a market game
in terms of its information structure.
2.3.1. Three Classes of Information Structures. We study three classes of information struc-
tures: conditionally independent (CI game), unconditionally independent (I game), and
neither conditionally independent nor unconditionally independent (D game). These three
classes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The rst two types impose natural inde-
pendence assumptions on the prior distribution P, and they were rst separately studied
by [Chen et al. 2007a] and [Dimitrov and Sami 2007], and later in their joint work [Chen
et al. 2010].
In a CI game, players' signals are independent conditioned on the realized event outcome.
Prior work [Chen et al. 2007b, 2010] showed that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (PBE) for the CI game where every player honestly reports his estimate in his rst
stage of participation. Thus, in this work, we focus on analyzing the I and D games.
For I games, players' signals are unconditionally independent from one another, but they
are not independent of and may stochastically inuence the event outcome. Formally, the
prior distribution P for an I game must satisfy: Pr(si)Pr(sj) = Pr(si;sj);8si 2 Si;sj 2 Sj
for any two players i and j. Dimitrov and Sami [2007] and Chen et al. [2010] showed that
the I game does not have a truthful PBE where every player honestly reports his estimate
as early as he can, but they left the existence of PBE as an open question.
To illustrate the I information structure, consider a stylized setting where each player
independently obtains a coin and observes a coin ip. The event to be predicted is some ag-
gregate information about all of the independent coin ips, for example, whether more than
1=3 of the coin ips are heads. In this example, the players' signals are independent because
the coin ips are independent events. A more realistic example involves a political election
prediction market. Each voter independently obtains some private information about the
election and decides on a vote, which is arguably independent from each other. The event
we are interested in is the election outcome, which is determined by all of the votes. Finally,
for an abstract example, each player's private information can be thought of as a single
piece of a jigsaw puzzle, and the event being forecasted is related to the completed picture.
Even though the CI and I information structures capture events in some natural settings,
they impose strong independence assumptions on the relationship between the players'
private signals. Ideally, we would like to understand the players' strategic behaviors in the
market game without restricting to a particular information structure. For this reason,
we study the D information structure consisting of signals that are neither conditionallyProceedings Article
independent and unconditionally independent. In other words, the signals in a D game are
both conditionally dependent and unconditionally dependent. Formally, a prior distribution
P in a D game satises: 9si 2 Si;sj 2 Sj; s.t. Pr(si)Pr(sj) 6= Pr(si;sj) for two players i
and j and 9si0 2 Si;sj0 2 Sj; s.t. Pr(si0;sj0j!) 6= Pr(si0j!)Pr(sj0j!) for two players i0 and
j0. It would be interesting to explore whether the D information structure could be further
divided up into smaller classes with intuitive properties.
2.3.2. The Distinguishability Condition. To avoid degenerate cases in our analysis, we assume
that the prior distribution P satises the following distinguishability condition, consisting
of two parts.
Denition 2.1. The prior distribution P satises the distinguishability condition if for
all i it satises inequality (1)
Pr(Y js i;si) 6= Pr(Y js i;s0
i);8s i 2 S i;8si;s0
i 2 Si [ fg;si 6= s0
i (1)
where si =  means player i's private signal is not observed, and S i = fS1 [ fgg   
fSi 1 [ fgg  fSi+1 [ fgg    fSm [ fgg, and inequality (2)
X
si2Si
psi Pr(Y jsi;s) 6=
X
si2Si
psi Pr(Y jsi;s0) (2)
where s 6= s0 are two dierent vectors of realized signals of any subset of players excluding
i.
Inequality (1) generalizes the general informativeness condition by Chen et al. [2010].
The inequality is satised if dierent signal realizations of player i always lead to dierent
posterior probabilities of ! = Y , for any vector of realized signals for any subset of the other
players (including unobserved signals). In other words, a player's signal always contains some
information. Inequality (2) is similar to the distinguishability assumption used by Dimitrov
and Sami [2010]. It requires that for any two realizations of signals of a subset of players,
they lead to dierent estimates for outcome Y given any belief about player i's signal. This
condition allows other players to infer the signals of the subset of players whenever they
reveal their information truthfully.
While the distinguishability condition may be a nontrivial technical restriction, it al-
lows us to focus on interesting strategic decisions in the game play without encountering
degenerated cases.
2.4. Solution Concept
We use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) solution concept, which is informally a
subgame perfect renement of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A PBE requires specifying
each player's strategy given a realized signal at each stage of the game as well as the player's
belief about the signals of players participating in all of the previous stages. The strategies
and the beliefs of the players form a PBE of the market game if and only if, for each player,
his strategy at every stage is optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are derived from the
strategies using Bayes' rule whenever possible.
2.5. Terminologies for Players' Strategies
By properties of the logarithmic scoring rule, at a player's last chance to participate in
the market, the player has the strictly dominant strategy of truthfully revealing his private
information. So at any PBE, all private information is fully incorporated into the market
estimate at the end of the market game. Thus, the focus of our analysis is on how quickly
information gets incorporated into the market estimate throughout the game. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we distinguish between truthful and non-truthful strategies for a player
in terms of when the player's private information is rst revealed in the market game.Proceedings Article
We use the term truthful strategy (also called truthful betting) to refer to the strategy
where at a player's rst chance to participate in the market, the player changes the market
estimate to his posterior probability of Y given his signal and his belief about other players'
signals. The truthful strategy fully reveals a player's private information as early as possible.
In contrast to the truthful strategy, a player may choose to misreport his information
and manipulate the market estimate. For instance, a player can play a mixed strategy and
reveal a noisy version of his signal to the subsequent players in the game. Alternatively, a
player may try to withhold his private information from the other players by not chang-
ing the market estimate at all. Such non-truthful strategies hurt information aggregation
in the market by causing the market estimate to contain inaccurate information at least
temporarily.
3. THE 3-STAGE MARKET GAME WITH ANY INFORMATION STRUCTURE
Before diving into the PBE analysis of the nite-stage market game, we describe some pre-
liminary analysis of the 3-stage market game with any information structure. In section 3.1,
we justify that, in order to describe a PBE of the 3-stage market game, it suces to describe
Alice's strategy in the rst stage and Bob's belief in the second stage. This allows us to
greatly simplify our exposition in later analyses. Next, we prove a theorem in section 3.2,
which allows us to systematic identify candidate PBE strategies for the players. This theo-
rem gives us a useful method to make educated guesses about the possible PBE strategies
in order to tackle the PBE existence question and to construct a PBE if one exists for the
3-stage market game with a given prior distribution. Finally, in section 3.3, we describe
a consistency condition, which must be satised by a player's strategy in any PBE of the
3-stage game.
3.1. Describing PBE of the 3-Stage Market Game
We present a preliminary analysis of the 3-stage market game and introduce some notations
for our later analyses.
In the 3-stage game, Alice and Bob observe their realized signals ai and bj respectively
at the beginning of the market. In the rst stage, Alice changes the market estimate for
outcome Y from the initial market estimate r0 to rA of her choice. In the second stage, Bob
observes Alice's rst-stage report rA and changes the market estimate to rB. In the third
stage, upon observing Bob's second-stage report rB, Alice changes the market estimate from
rB to rf, and then the market closes.
Alice's rst-stage strategy is a mapping  : SA ! ([0;1]) where ([0;1]) is the set
of probability distributions over [0;1]. For clarity of analysis and presentation, we assume
that the support of Alice's rst-stage strategy is nite. The results in this paper however
hold even if the support of Alice's rst-stage strategy is innite. Let ai(rA) denote the
probability that Alice reports rA in the rst stage after observing the signal ai according
to the strategy .
In the second stage, when Bob observes Alice's rst-stage report rA, he forms a belief
about Alice's signals. Bob's belief species the likelihood that Alice received signal ai when
Alice reported rA and Bob received signal bj for any i and j. Let rA;bj(ai) denote the
probability that Bob's belief assigns for Alice's ai signal when Alice reported rA and Bob
received signal bj. rA;bj(ai) is dened for any rA 2 [0;1]. At any PBE, we need to describe
Bob's belief both on and o the equilibrium path. When rA is in the support of Alice's
rst-stage PBE strategy, the game is on the equilibrium path and rA;bj(ai) is derived from
Alice's strategy using Bayes' rule according to the PBE denition. However, when rA is not
in the support of Alice's equilibrium strategy, that is, the game is o the equilibrium path,
rA;bj(ai) is still important for a PBE because the belief needs to ensure that Alice does
not nd it protable to deviate from her PBE strategy. O the equilibrium path, there are
often more than one set of Bob's beliefs that can satisfy this requirement.Proceedings Article
Bob only participates once, in the second stage of this game. By properties of strictly
proper scoring rules, Bob has a strictly dominant strategy to report his posterior probability
estimate of the event truthfully, given his belief. Thus, at any PBE, Bob must be using a
pure strategy, which is fully determined by his belief, his signal, and Alice's rst-stage
report. Let xbj(rA) denote Bob's optimal report given his signal bj and Alice's rst-stage
report rA. At any PBE, Bob's optimal report xbj(rA) can be determined from his belief as
follows:
xbj(rA) =
X
i
rA;bj(ai)Pr(Y jai;bj); 8bj;0  j  nB   1;rA 2 [0;1]:
In the third stage, Alice observes Bob's report and may change the market estimate again.
At any PBE, knowing Bob's PBE strategy, Alice's belief on the equilibrium path can be
derived from Bob's strategy using Bayes' rule. This is Alice's last stage of participation.
Thus, by properties of strictly proper scoring rules, Alice has a dominant strategy to report
her probability estimate truthfully. Similar to Bob's strategy, Alice's third-stage strategy
must be a pure strategy and it is fully determined by her belief, her signal, and Bob's report.
We note that Alice's belief o the equilibrium path in the third stage is not important,
because Bob has a dominant strategy in the second stage and will not deviate from it no
matter what belief Alice has.
The above analysis shows that, to describe a PBE of the 3-stage market game, it suces
to specify Alice's strategy in the rst stage and Bob's belief in the second stage. The rest
of the strategic play is completely determined given them.
Moreover, for clarity in our analysis, we chose to specify Bob's strategy rather than
Bob's belief at a PBE. We can easily derive a Bob's belief such that Bob's strategy is
optimal given the derived belief, shown as follows. First, Bob's strategy is valid if and only
if xbj(rA) 2 [minifPr(Y jai;bj)g;maxifPr(Y jai;bj)g] for any bj, because for any possible
belief for Bob, his posterior probability should always fall into this interval. When rA is in
the support of Alice's PBE strategy, Bob's belief is derived from Alice's PBE strategy using
Bayes' rule. When rA is not in the support of Alice's PBE strategy, the PBE denition
requires that Bob's belief be derived from a possible strategy for Alice using Bayes' rule.
For such an rA, we know that minai;bj Pr(Y jai;bj)  xbj(rA)  maxai;bj Pr(Y jai00;bj) holds
and one of the two inequalities must be strict due to the distinguishability assumption. Let
ai0 and ai00 be Alice's signal in minai;bj Pr(Y jai;bj) and maxai;bj Pr(Y jai;bj) respectively.
Then consider a possible strategy satisfying ai0(rA) = p and ai00(rA) = 1   p where
p =
xbj(rA) Pr(Y jai0)
Pr(Y jai00) Pr(Y jai0), and ai(rA) = 0 for any other ai. This strategy for Alice is valid,
and thus we can derive Bob's o the equilibrium path belief for rA from this strategy using
Bayes' rule.
3.2. Systematically Identify Candidate PBE Strategies
To tackle the PBE existence problem and construct a PBE if one exists, it is essential that we
make an educated guess of the players' possible PBE strategies. Theorem 3.1 below allows
us to pinpoint a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage game with any information
structure, by comparing Alice's ex-ante expected total payo (of both the rst and the third
stages) when using dierent rst-stage strategies assuming that Bob knows and conditions
on Alice's strategy.
For Theorem 3.1 below, for any of Alice's strategy 1, let A(1;1) be Alice's ex-ante
expected payo when Alice uses strategy 1 in the rst stage, Bob knows Alice's rst-stage
strategy and conditions his belief on Alice's strategy. This means that, for any r in the
support of Alice's rst-stage strategy 1, Bob's belief is derived from strategy 1 by using
Bayes' rule. For any other r, there is no restriction on Bob's belief as long as it is valid.Proceedings Article
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we make an important distinction between a player's ex-ante
and ex-interim expected payo. A player's ex-ante expected payo is his expected payo
without observing his signal, whereas his ex-interim expected payo is his expected payo
given his signal.
Theorem 3.1. For the 3-stage market game, if two dierent rst-stage strategies 1
and 2 for Alice satisfy inequality (3), then strategy 2 cannot be part of any PBE of this
game.
A(1;1) > A(2;2) (3)
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that two dierent rst-stage strategies
1 and 2 for Alice satisfy inequality (3), and Alice's rst-stage strategy 2 is part of a
PBE of the 3-stage market game. Let B denote Bob's belief at this PBE. B species a
distribution over Alice's signals for every possible rst-stage report r 2 [0;1] and any of
Bob's signals bj. Alice's ex-ante expected payo at this PBE is A(2;2). This proof holds
for any valid belief for Bob at this PBE.
Suppose that Alice deviates from this PBE to play the strategy 1 in the rst stage and
Bob has the same belief B as before. Let A(1;2) denote Alice's total ex-ante expected
payo in the game at this deviation. The expression A(1;2) is well dened since Alice
knows Bob's belief and strategy at the original PBE. Similarly, let B(1;2) denote Bob's
ex-ante expected payo in the second stage at this deviation.
At any PBE of this game, in the third stage, Alice can always infer Bob's signal given Bob's
report by the distinguishability condition. So Alice always changes the market estimate to
Pr(Y jai;bj) in the third stage given Alice's signal ai and Bob's signal bj. Thus, the total
expected payo that Alice and Bob can get at any PBE of the 3-stage market game is
AB =
X
ai;bj

Pr(Y;ai;bj)log
Pr(Y jai;bj)
r0 + Pr(N;ai;bj)log
Pr(Njai;bj)
1   r0

which is xed given the initial probability r0 and the prior distribution P. Note that the
above result holds not only at a PBE but whenever Bob reveals all of his information and
Alice knowing his strategy maximizes her expected prot. Therefore, by denition of AB,
we must have
AB = A(1;2) + B(1;2);81;2 (4)
Inequality (3) is satised by assumption, so we have
A(1;1) > A(2;2)
)AB   A(1;1) > AB   A(2;2) (5)
)B(1;1) < B(2;2) (6)
where equation (5) is due to equation (4).
For a xed rst-stage strategy of Alice and for any belief of Bob, Bob's ex-ante expected
payo is maximized when his belief is derived from Alice's rst-stage strategy using Bayes'
rule. This can be proven as follows. When Bob's belief is derived from Alice's rst-stage
strategy by using Bayes' rule, then in the second stage, Bob changes the market estimate to
xbj(rA) when Alice reports rA in the rst stage and Bob receives the bj signal. Recall that
by denition, xbj(rA) = Pr(Y jrA;bj) =
P
ai Pr(aijrA;bj)Pr(Y jai;bj). In this case, Bob's
expected payo in the second stage is
X
bj;rA
Pr(bj;rA)

xbj(rA)log
xbj(rA)
rA
+ (1   xbj(rA))log
1   xbj(rA)
1   rA

: (7)Proceedings Article
When Bob has another belief, let ^ x denote Bob's optimal report with this belief. Then Bob's
expected payo in the second stage is
X
bj;rA
Pr(bj;rA)

xbj(rA)log
^ x
rA
+ (1   xbj(rA))log
1   ^ x
1   rA

: (8)
The dierence in Bob's ex-ante expected payo for the two dierent beliefs for Bob is (7) -
(8):
X
bj;rA
Pr(bj;rA)

xbj(rA)log
xbj(rA)
^ x
+ (1   xbj(rA))log
1   xbj(rA)
1   ^ x

which is nonnegative by properties of the relative entropy.
Therefore, for any two rst-stage strategies 1 and 2 for Alice, we have shown that
B(1;2)  B(1;1) (9)
Combining inequalities (6) and (9), we have
B(1;2) < B(2;2) ) AB   A(1;2) < AB   A(2;2)
) A(1;2) > A(2;2): (10)
According to inequality (10), if Alice uses the rst-stage strategy 2 at a PBE, then she
can improve her ex-ante expected payo by deviating to using the strategy 1. Then there
must exist at least one realized signal for Alice, say ai, such that Alice's ex-interim expected
payo after receiving the ai signal is higher when she deviates to the strategy 1 than
when she follows the strategy 2. (Otherwise, if Alice's ex-interim expected payo for every
realized signal is lower when she deviates to using the strategy 1 than when she follows the
strategy 2, then her ex-ante expected payo must also be lower when she deviates to using
the strategy 1 than when she follows the strategy 2, contradicting inequality (10).) As
a result, when Alice receives the ai signal, she can improve her ex-interim expected payo
by deviating to using the strategy 1 and this contradicts with our assumption that Alice's
rst-stage strategy 2 is part of a PBE of the 3-stage market game.
According to Theorem 3.1, to nd Alice's possible PBE strategies for the 3-stage market
game, it suces to compare Alice's ex-ante expected payos for all possible rst-stage
strategies assuming Bob knows Alice's strategy, and only the strategies maximizing Alice's
ex-ante expected payo can possible be Alice's PBE strategy. This gives us a systematic
way to identify possible PBE strategies without worrying about constructing Bob's o-
equilibrium path beliefs.
3.3. The Consistency Condition
Our analyses of the 3-stage game frequently make use of a consistency condition described
in Theorem 2 by Chen et al. [2010]. For completeness, we re-state this condition as a lemma
below. The consistency condition requires that, at a PBE of the 3-stage game, for any rA
in the support of Alice's rst-stage strategy , the posterior probability of Y given  and
rA should be equal to rA. Intuitively, this requires that, Alice's rst-stage strategy must
not leave free payo for Bob to claim in the second stage. If Alice's rst-stage strategy does
not satisfy the consistency condition, then Bob can get positive expected payo simply by
changing the market estimate to a value satisfying the consistency condition, and Bob can
claim this positive expected payo without having any private information about the event
being predicted. This is contrary to Alice's goal of minimizing Bob's expected payo since
the 3-stage market game is a constant-sum game at any PBE.Proceedings Article
Lemma 3.2 (Consistency Condition for 3-Stage Market Game). At a PBE of
the 3-stage market game, if  is Alice's rst-stage strategy and rA is in the support of
strategy  (i.e. 9ai;ai(rA) > 0), then  must satisfy the following consistency condition:
Pr(Y j;rA) = rA
4. PBE OF THE FINITE-STAGE I GAME
We characterize all PBE of the nite-stage I game in this section. Our analysis begins
with the 3-stage I game. Alice participates twice in the game, so she may have incentives to
manipulate the market estimate in the rst stage of this game. We rst identify a unique
candidate PBE strategy for Alice by showing that if a PBE exists for the 3-stage I game, then
Alice's rst-stage strategy must be changing the market estimate to the prior probability
of the event. This is equivalent to Alice delaying her participation until the third stage
if the market starts with the prior probability of the event. We refer to this strategy as
Alice's delaying strategy for the 3-stage I game. Alice's delaying strategy reveals absolutely
no information to Bob about her signal. Next, we explicitly construct a PBE of the 3-stage I
game in which Alice uses the delaying strategy in the rst stage. These two results together
imply that, the delaying PBE is unique for this game, in the sense that Alice must use the
delaying strategy in every PBE of this game, even though Bob's belief can be dierent o
the equilibrium path.
Given the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I game, we construct a family of PBE for the
nite-stage I game using backward induction. Suppose that the players in the nite-stage
I game are ordered by their last stages of participation. Then at every PBE of the nite-
stage I game, each player i withholds his private information until after player i 1 nishes
participating in the game, and then player i may truthfully reveal his private information in
any of the subsequent stages in which he participates. In particular, there exists a particular
PBE in this family where each player does not reveal any private information until his last
stage of participation, and this is arguably the worst PBE of this game for the goal of
information aggregation.
4.1. Delaying PBE of 3-stage I Game
We argue below that the delaying strategy is the only candidate PBE strategy for Alice in
the 3-stage I game. Theorem 4.1 essentially proves that the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I
game is unique with respect to Alice's strategy, if a PBE exists for this game. Part of the
proof of Theorem 4.1 uses the argument in the proof of Theorem 2 in Chen et al. [2010].
Theorem 4.1. If the 3-stage I game has a PBE, then Alice's strategy at the PBE must
be the delaying strategy, i.e. changing the market estimate to the prior probability of the
event.
Proof Sketch. We rst argue that if a PBE exists for the 3-stage I game, then Alice's
rst-stage strategy at this PBE must be a deterministic strategy. We show this by contra-
diction by assuming that there are at least two points in the support of Alice's rst-stage
PBE strategy. Then we construct another rst-stage strategy achieving a better expected
payo for Alice, which means that the original strategy cannot be a PBE strategy by Theo-
rem 3.1. By the consistency condition, if Alice's rst-stage strategy is deterministic, it must
be the strategy of changing the market estimate to the prior probability of the event.
While the delaying strategy is the only possible PBE strategy for the 3-stage I game,
we still don't know whether a PBE exists. In order for a PBE to exist, there must exist a
belief of Bob to ensure that Alice does not nd it protable to deviate from the delaying
strategy to any other strategy. Identifying such a belief for Bob can be challenging because
essentially we need to specify what Bob will do upon observing every possible report of
Alice in [0;1]. In Theorem 4.2, we give an explicit construction of a PBE of the 3-stageProceedings Article
I game in which Alice uses the delaying strategy in the rst stage. At this PBE, Alice's
rst-stage strategy reveals no information to Bob about her private signal, and Bob's belief
makes this delaying strategy the optimal choice for Alice.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a PBE of the 3-stage I game where Alice's rst-stage strat-
egy is
ai(Pr(Y )) = 1; 8i = 0;:::;nA   1
and Bob's second-stage strategy is
xbj(rA) =
8
<
:
fj(min
j ); rA 2 [0;min
j )
fj(rA); rA 2 [min
j ;max
j ]
fj(max
j ); rA 2 (max
j ;1]
; 8j = 0;:::;nB   1
where
fj(rA) =
Pr(Y jbj)Pr(N)rA
Pr(Y )Pr(Njbj) + (Pr(Y jbj)   Pr(Y ))rA
min
j =min
ai
fPr(Y jai;bj)g;max
j = max
ai
fPr(Y jai;bj)g
min
j =f
 1
j (min
j );max
j = f
 1
j (max
j )
Proof Sketch. We describe the rst part of the proof below showing that Bob's strat-
egy is a valid PBE strategy.
First, Bob's belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice's rst-stage strategy us-
ing Bayes' rule since xbj(Pr(Y )) = Pr(Y jbj): Moreover, for Bob's strategy to be a valid PBE
strategy, it must satisfy xbj(rA) 2 [minaifPr(Y jai;bj)g;maxaifPr(Y jai;bj)g];8bj;rA 2
[0;1]. To show this, note that by denition, min
j < max
j , min
j < max
j , and fj(rA) is
monotonically increasing in rA 2 [0;1] since
dfj(rA)
drA
=
Pr(Y )(1   Pr(Y ))Pr(Y jbj)(1   Pr(Y jbj))
fPr(Y )Pr(Njbj) + (Pr(Y jbj)   Pr(Y ))rAg
2 > 0
Hence the domain of xbj(rA) is well-dened. In addition, we have
min
j = fj(min
j )  xbj(rA)  fj(max
j ) = max
j ;8rA 2 [0;1]:
Thus, Bob's strategy is valid. The rest of the proof then proves that Alice's delaying strategy
is a best response to Bob's strategy.
Based on Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 above, we have established both the existence and the
uniqueness (with respect to Alice's rst-stage strategy) of the PBE of the 3-stage I game.
4.2. A Family of PBE for the Finite-Stage I Game
We are ready to characterize the PBE of the nite-stage I game. By using backward induc-
tion and the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I game, we characterize a family of PBE of the
nite-stage I game in Theorem 4.5. At any PBE in this family, players delay revealing their
private information as much as possible.
We rst generalize the consistency condition for the 3-stage game to the nite-stage
game in Lemma 4.3. This consistency condition dictates that, for any stage k, the posterior
probability of ! = Y given the participants' strategies and reports in the rst k stages must
be equal to the report of the participant in stage k at any PBE of this game.
Lemma 4.3 (Consistency Condition for Finite-Stage Market Game). At a
PBE of the nite-stage I game, suppose that k and rk are the strategy and the reportProceedings Article
for the participant of stage k respectively, then for every k, the participants' strategies and
reports must satisfy equation (11).
Pr(Y jr1;:::;rk;1;:::;k) = rk (11)
In Lemma 4.4 below, we analyze the tail of the nite-stage I game starting from the
second-to-last stage of participation for the last player to the last stage of the game. The
theorem shows that, in terms of strategic play, this portion of the nite-stage I game es-
sentially reduces to a 3-stage I game. Thus, at any PBE, the last player chooses to not
participate in the game in his second-to-last stage of participation. This key argument will
be used repeatedly in the proof of the PBE of the nite-stage I game.
For Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.5, let the m players of the nite-stage I game be ordered
by their last stages of participation. That is, for any 1  i  m, let ti denote player i's last
stage of participation, such that ti < tj for any 1  i < j  m.
Lemma 4.4. Let stage k be the second to last stage of participation for player m (k <
tm). At any PBE of the nite-stage I game, player m does not change the market estimate
in stage k.
Finally, in Theorem 4.5, we prove the existence of a family of PBE of the nite-stage I
game.
Theorem 4.5. At any PBE of the nite-stage I game, the players use the following
strategies:
| From stage 1 to stage t1   1, player 1 uses any strategy that satises the consistency
condition. In stage t1, player 1 truthfully reveals his signal.
| For any 2  i  m   1, from stage 1 to stage ti 1   1, player i does not participate in
the game. From stage ti 1 + 1 to stage ti   1, player i uses any strategy that satises the
consistency condition. In stage ti, player i truthfully reveals his signal.
| From stage 1 to stage tm   1, player m does not participate in the game. In stage tm,
player m truthfully reveals his signal.
Proof Sketch. We describe the argument for player m and m   1 here.
By properties of LMSR, player m truthfully reveals his signal in stage tm, which is the
last stage of the game. If stage t denotes the second to last stage of participation for player
m, then the game from stage t to tm can be reduced to a 3-stage I game (where player
m is Alice). By Lemma 4.4, player m does not participate in stage t. Let t be the new
second to last stage of participation for player m, and the game from stage t to tm again
reduces to a 3-stage I game. Applying Lemma 4.4 again, we know that player m does not
participate in stage t either. Inferring recursively, player m does not participate in any
stage from 1 to tm   1.
For player m   1, he truthfully reveals his signal in stage tm 1 by properties of LMSR.
From stage tm 2 + 1 to tm 1   1, player m   1 is the only participant because players 1
to m   2 already nished participating and player m does not participate by our earlier
argument. Thus, player m   1 uses any strategy satisfying the consistency condition from
stage tm 2 +1 to tm 1  1. We combine the stages from tm 2 +1 to tm 1  1 (denoted t)
as the new last stage for player m 1. Let t be the new second to last stage of participation
for player m   1, and note that t < tm 2. Again, the game from stage t to t reduces
to a 3-stage I game (where player m   1 is Alice). By Lemma 4.4, player m   1 does not
participate in stage t. Inferring recursively, player m 1 does not participate in any stage
from 1 to tm 2   1.
To understand Theorem 4.5, consider dividing the nite-stage I game into m segments
with player i being the owner of the segment from stage ti 1 + 1 to stage ti. At any PBE,
each player does not participate in any stage before his segment, uses a strategy satisfyingProceedings Article
the consistency condition within his segment, and truthfully reveals his private signal at
the last stage of his segment.
Figure 1 illustrates a particular PBE of a nite-stage I game. The letters A, B, and C
denote the three players and their sequence of participation. A black letter means that the
player truthfully reveals his signal in that stage. If the letter is gray, then the player uses
a strategy satisfying the consistency condition. Note that the strategy of not changing the
market estimate satises the consistency condition. A white letter means that the player is
scheduled to participate but does not change the market estimate in that stage. The thick
vertical bars mark the boundaries of the players' segments in the game.
Fig. 1. A PBE of a Finite-Stage I Game with 3 players
The multiple PBE of the nite-stage I game dier by how early each player chooses to
truthfully reveal his signal within his segment of the game. For the purpose of information
aggregation, the best case is when every player chooses to truthfully reveal his signal in the
rst stage of his own segment. However, there exists a PBE where every player waits until
the last stage of his segment to truthfully reveal his information, and this is arguably the
worst PBE for the goal of information aggregation.
Although we analyze the I game with a pre-specied participation order, our results still
provide useful insights if the players endogenously choose when to participate in the game.
Consider the I game with T stages where each player endogenously chooses in which stage
to participate in the game. This model is reasonable if the market game has a pre-specied
closing time and a minimum time dierence between any two trades. Our results for the I
game suggest that, all players will choose to participate in the last stage of the game. As a
result, the equilibrium analysis of this game would critically depend on how multiple trades
submitted in the same stage are executed; this dependency is undesirable. Our assumption
of pre-specied participation order circumvents this undesirable dependency and our results
still provide useful insights for players' behaviors in this setting.
4.3. Intuition for the PBE of the I and CI games
Comparing the PBE of the nite-stage I game with the truthful PBE of the nite-stage CI
game [Chen et al. 2010], it is interesting to note how two dierent information structures
can induce equilibrium behaviors at the opposite ends of the spectrum: The players in the
CI game race to reveal their private information as early as possible, whereas the players
in the I game delay as much as possible to reveal their private information. To understand
this dierence, we describe some intuition below by appealing to the concepts of substitutes
and complements.
In the I games, players' private signals can be intuitively considered as perfect com-
plements. The unconditionally independent private signals have large mutual information
conditioned on the realized event outcome. Therefore, revealing one player's signal allows
other players to infer a large amount of information about the realized event outcome. As a
result, the sum of players' expected payos when each player reports a posterior probability
conditioned only on his own private signal is strictly less than the total expected payo that
can be earned by reporting a posterior probability conditioned on all of the available private
signals. This is true given any current market estimate and any realizations of the private
signals. This means that, every player in the I game prefers to wait for other players toProceedings Article
make their reports rst since observing more reports and thus inferring more signals always
improves the players expected payo.
In contrast, in the CI games, players' private signals are perfect substitutes. Conditioned
on the realized event outcome, the private signals are independent of each other, so their
mutual information is zero. Thus, a revealed private signal does not allow other players to
infer any information about the realized event outcome. As a result, the sum of players'
expected payos when each player reports a posterior probability conditioned only on his
own private signal is strictly greater than the total expected payo that can be earned by
reporting a posterior probability conditioned on all of the available private signals, given
any current market estimate and any realized private signals. Thus, players prefer to race
to capitalize on their private information early in the game.
5. THE 3-STAGE D GAME
The CI and I games admit two families of PBE that seem to lie at the two extremes of
the spectrum: players race to reveal information early in the CI game, but race to withhold
information in the I game. It is interesting to ask whether some instances of the D game
may give rise to one of these two types of equilibria too. Yet, it is challenging to perform
equilibrium analysis for the D game, because the dependency among the players' signals
does not provide precise mathematical conditions that we can leverage.
Our goal in this section is moderate. We would like to explore a restricted 3-stage D game
and obtain insights on what the players' PBE strategies may look like for this game if a
PBE exists. We do not prove the existence of a PBE for this class. Nevertheless, we provide
a sucient condition for the prior distribution, which guarantees the existence of a truthful
PBE for the D game. We also provide an example distribution that satises this condition.
In this section, we consider the 3-stage D game where Alice's private signal has only 2
realizations (nA = 2).
5.1. An Expression for Alice's Ex-Interim Expected Payo
We derive an expression for Alice's ex-interim expected payo at any PBE of the 3-stage
market game (denoted uai(r)), for a given signal ai and a particular rst-stage report r.
The purpose of discussing this expression is two fold. First, given uai(r), Alice's ex-ante
expected payo by using a particular strategy can be easily calculated and used to identify
Alice's candidate PBE strategies by Theorem 3.1. Second, to construct a PBE of the market
game, it suces to check that the requirements of a PBE are satised using uai(r). Thus
our discussion of this expression prepares us the results in the following two subsections.
When deriving the expression of uai(r), we assume that Alice's rst-stage payo satises
the consistency condition, Alice and Bob know each other's strategies and beliefs, and
mostly importantly Bob's belief for any Alice's report r is derived as if the belief is on
the equilibrium path for any given r. That is, for any Alice's report f, Bob's belief for r
is derived from Alice's strategy using Bayes' rule as if the report r is in the support of
Alice's rst-stage strategy. The expression of uai(r) is given below. The complete derivation
is included in the Appendix.
uai(r) =Pr(Y jai)log
r
Pr(Y )
+ Pr(Njai)log
1   r
1   Pr(Y )
+
X
j

Pr(Y;bjjai)log
Pr(Y jai;bj)
xbj(r)
+ Pr(N;bjjai)log
Pr(Njai;bj)
1   xbj(r)

(12)
where xbj(r) is
xbj(r) =
Pr(Y;bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(Y;bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))
Pr(bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))Proceedings Article
5.2. Three Candidate PBE Strategies for Alice
We identify three candidate PBE strategies for Alice in the 3-stage D game. These three
strategies are the truthful strategy, the delaying strategy, and a mixed strategy in which
Alice makes a deterministic report r for one realized signal and she mixes between reporting
r and reporting her true posterior probability estimate for the other realized signal.
Theorem 5.1. If there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game, then Alice must play one
of the following three strategies at the PBE 2:
| the truthful strategy: ai(Pr(Y jai)) = 1;8i = 0;1
| the delaying strategy: ai(Pr(Y )) = 1;8i = 0;1
| the mixed strategy:
ai(Pr(Y jai)) = 1   p;ai(r) = p;a1 i(r) = 1 (13)
where p =
Pr(a1 i)(r Pr(Y ja1 i))
Pr(ai)(Pr(Y jai) r) and uai(Pr(Y jai)) = uai(r) is satised for some r 2
(mini Pr(Y jai);Pr(Y )) [ (Pr(Y );maxi Pr(Y jai)), 8i = 0;1.
5.3. A Sucient Condition for the Truthful PBE
When the information structure of a 3-stage D game satises a monotonicity condition, we
show in Theorem 5.2 that there is a truthful PBE of this game. This monotonicity condition
requires that, for a xed i = 0;1, Alice's ex-interim expected payo uai(r) is monotonically
decreasing as the value of r changes from Pr(Y jai) to Pr(Y ja1 i).
Theorem 5.2. If for any i = 0;1, uai(r) is monotonically decreasing as the value of r
changes from Pr(Y jai) to Pr(Y ja1 i), then there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game where
Alice's rst-stage strategy is
ai(Pr(Y jai)) = 1;8i = 0;1
and Bob's second-stage strategy is
xbj(r) =
Pr(Y;bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(Y;bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))
Pr(bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))
;8j = 0;:::;nB   1 (14)
Next, we give an example of a D information structure satisfying the monotonicity con-
dition above.
Example 5.3. Consider an instance of the 3-stage D game where the prior distribution
P is given by the following table. In Table I below, each cell gives the value of Pr(!;sA;sB)
for the corresponding realizations of !, sA, and sB. This prior distribution satises the
Table I. An example prior distribution.
! = Y ! = N
a0 a1 a0 a1
b0 0:15 0:2 b0 0:2 0:05
b1 0:05 0:05 b1 0:25 0:05
monotonicity condition specied in Theorem 5.2 because, as r increases from Pr(Y ja0) to
Pr(Y ja1), ua0(r) decreases and ua1(r) increases.
2Technically, Alice's PBE strategy could be of the form ai(Pr(Y jai)) = 1   p;ai(r) =
p;a1 i(Pr(Y ja1 i)) = 1   q;a1 i(r) = q, for some p;q 2 [0;1], r 2 [minai Pr(Y jai);maxai Pr(Y jai)].
However, if there exists a PBE of a 3-stage D game where Alice plays this mixed strategy, then there also
exists a truthful PBE for this game. So we include this strategy as a special case when the 3-stage D game
has a truthful PBE.Proceedings Article
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyze how the dependency among the participants' private information aect their
strategic behavior when trading in a prediction market. We model the logarithmic market
scoring rule prediction market as an extensive-form Bayesian game, and characterize PBE
of this game for dierent information structures of the market participants. When the
participants have unconditionally independent private information (I game), we show that
there exists a family of PBE for the market game with a nite number of players and a
nite number of stages. At any PBE in this family, assuming that the players are ordered
by their last stages of participation, each player does not participate in the game before
the previous player's last stage of participation. There exists a PBE where every player
waits until their last stage of participation to truthful reveal their information, and this
is arguably the worst outcome with respect to information aggregation. A future research
question is to determine whether a PBE exists for the I game with a nite number of players
but an innite number of stages.
We also study a restricted version of the market game with 2 players and 3 stages when
the players' private information is neither conditionally independent nor unconditionally
independent (D game). Our result narrows down the possible PBE strategies to three simple
strategies if a PBE exists. We conjecture that, for any instance of the D game, there exists
a PBE where the rst participant plays one of these three strategies. For future work, we
are interested in proving the existence of the PBE of the D game for any prior distribution,
characterizing sucient and necessary conditions for for each type of PBE to exist, and
exploring whether the PBE of the 3-stage game extends to the game with a nite or an
innite number of stages.
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A. OMITTED PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. The technique used in this proof is analogous to that of Theorem 2 in Chen
et al. [2010].
Let  be Alice's rst-stage strategy at a PBE of the 3-stage I game. By Lemma 3.2, 
must satisfy the consistency condition. At any PBE of the 3-stage I game, for a xed prior
distribution and a xed initial market probability, the total of Alice's ex-ante expected
payo and Bob's ex-ante expected payo in the game is a constant. Therefore, Alice seeks
to choose a rst-stage strategy in order to minimize Bob's ex-ante expected payo in the
game. We will show that  must dictate Alice to change the market probability to the prior
probability regardless of Alice's realized signal.
We rst argue that  must be a deterministic strategy, i.e. there exists a unique r 2 [0;1]
such that ai(r) = 1 for any realized signal ai for Alice. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists a realized signal ai such that the support of strategy  for signal
ai has at least 2 points, r1, r2, and perhaps a set of other points R. Then we construct
another strategy 0 for Alice and show that Bob's expected payo when Alice uses the
strategy 0 is less than his expected payo when Alice uses the strategy , assuming that
Bob knows and conditions on Alice's rst-stage strategy.
Let r3 = r1+r2
2 be the midpoint of r1 and r2. Let the new strategy 0 for Alice randomize
over r1, r3, and the same set of remaining points R. Under 0, the probability that Alice
receives signal ai and reports r1 is
Pr(r1) Pr(r2)
Pr(r1) Pr(ai;r1), and the probability that Alice
receives signal ai and reports r3 is
Pr(r2)
Pr(r1)Pr(ai;r1) + Pr(ai;r2). Under strategy 0, Alice
mixes between reporting r1 and r3 with probability Pr(r1) Pr(r2) and 2Pr(r2) respectively.
For this strategy 0, we can compute Pr(aijr3) as follows.
Pr(aijr3) =
Pr(ai;r3)
Pr(r3)
=
Pr(r2)
Pr(r1)Pr(ai;r1) + Pr(ai;r2)
2Pr(r2)
=
1
2
Pr(aijr1) +
1
2
Pr(aijr2)
Note that xbj(r3) has the following relationship with xbj(r1) and xbj(r2) as shown below.
xbj(r3) =
X
bj
Pr(aijr3)Pr(Y jai;bj) =
X
bj

1
2
Pr(aijr1) +
1
2
Pr(aijr2)

Pr(Y jai;bj)
=
xbj(r1) + xbj(r2)
2
(15)
Let B() denote Bob's ex-ante expected payo when Alice uses strategy  and Bob
knows and conditions on Alice using the strategy . We derive the expression for B()
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below.

B() =Pr(r1)
X
bj
Pr(bjjr1)

xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
r1
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1   r1

+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bjjr2)

xbj(r2)log
xbj(r2)
r2
+ (1   xbj(r2))log
1   xbj(r2)
1   r2

+ remaining prot over R
=Pr(r1)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r2)log
xbj(r2)
P
bj xbj(r2)
+ (1   xbj(r2))log
1   xbj(r2)
1  
P
bj xbj(r2)
)
+ remaining prot over R
=(Pr(r1)   Pr(r2))
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r2)log
xbj(r2)
P
bj xbj(r2)
+ (1   xbj(r2))log
1   xbj(r2)
1  
P
bj xbj(r2)
)
+ remaining prot over R
When Alice uses strategy 0, Bob's ex-ante expected payo B(0) is less than his ex-ante
expected payo B(), as shown below.

B(
0) =(Pr(r1)   Pr(r2))
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ 2Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r3)log
xbj(r3)
P
bj xbj(r3)
+ (1   xbj(r3))log
1   xbj(r3)
1  
P
bj xbj(r3)
)
+ remaining prot over R
=(Pr(r1)   Pr(r2))
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ 2Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
8
<
:
xbj(r3)log
xbj (r1)+xbj (r2)
2
P
bj
xbj (r1)+xbj (r2)
2
+

1  
xbj(r1) + xbj(r2)
2

log
1  
xbj (r1)+xbj (r2)
2
1  
P
bj
xbj (r1)+xbj (r2)
2
9
=
;
+ remaining prot over R (16)
<(Pr(r1)   Pr(r2))
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
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+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r1)log
xbj(r1)
P
bj xbj(r1)
+ (1   xbj(r1))log
1   xbj(r1)
1  
P
bj xbj(r1)
)
+ Pr(r2)
X
bj
Pr(bj)
(
xbj(r2)log
xbj(r2)
P
bj xbj(r2)
+ (1   xbj(r2))log
1   xbj(r2)
1  
P
bj xbj(r2)
)
+ remaining prot over R (17)
=
B()
where equation (16) follows from equation (15), and the inequality (17) follows from the
strict convexity of relative entropy when the signals satisfy the informativeness condition.
Therefore, for any Alice's strategy  where for at least one realized signal the support of
the strategy has two or more points in its support (i.e. deterministic), there always exists a
strategy 0 such that B(0) < B(). This means that, at any PBE of this game, Alice's
rst-stage strategy must have only one point in its support. Such a strategy for Alice does
not reveal any information to Bob. If Alice's rst-stage strategy is deterministic, we must
have ai(r) = 1 for some r 2 [0;1]. Then, by the consistency condition, the only point in
the support of Alice's strategy must be Pr(Y ), as shown below.
Pr(Y jr;) = r
)
Pr(Y ja0)a0(r)Pr(a0) + Pr(Y ja1)a1(r)Pr(a1)
Pr(a0)a0(r) + Pr(a1)a1(r)
= r
)
Pr(Y ja0)Pr(a0) + Pr(Y ja1)Pr(a1)
Pr(a0) + Pr(a1)
= r
)r = Pr(Y ja0)Pr(a0) + Pr(Y ja1)Pr(a1) = Pr(Y )
Therefore, at any PBE of the 3-stage I game, Alice's strategy must be ai(Pr(Y )) =
1;8ai.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. According to the theorem statement, Alice's rst-stage strategy is
ai(Pr(Y )) = 1;i = 0;:::;nA   1
and Bob's second-stage strategy is
xbj(rA) =
8
<
:
fj(min
j ); rA 2 [0;min
j )
fj(rA); rA 2 [min
j ;max
j ]
fj(max
j ); rA 2 (max
j ;1]
;j = 0;:::;nB   1
where
fj(rA) =
Pr(Y jbj)Pr(N)rA
Pr(Y )Pr(Njbj) + (Pr(Y jbj)   Pr(Y ))rA
min
j =min
ai
fPr(Y jai;bj)g;max
j = max
ai
fPr(Y jai;bj)g
min
j =f
 1
j (min
j );max
j = f
 1
j (max
j )
To prove that Alice's and Bob's strategies form a PBE of the 3-stage I game, we need to
show 2 things:
(1) Bob's strategy is valid. That is, 8j;8rA 2 [0;1], xbj(rA) 2 [min
j ;max
j ];
(2) Alice's expected payo uai(rA) after receiving any signal ai is uniquely maximized by
reporting rA = Pr(Y ) given Bob's strategy.
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(1) We rst show that Bob's strategy is valid. First, note that fj(rA) is monotonically
increasing in rA 2 [0;1] since
dfj(rA)
drA
=
Pr(Y )(1   Pr(Y ))Pr(Y jbj)(1   Pr(Y jbj))
fPr(Y )Pr(Njbj) + (Pr(Y jbj)   Pr(Y ))rAg
2 > 0
Second, we have min
j < max
j , so min
j < max
j . Hence the domain of xbj(rA) is well-
dened. In addition,
min
j = fj(min
j )  xbj(rA)  fj(max
j ) = max
j ;8rA 2 [0;1]:
Therefore, Bob's strategy is valid since
xbj(rA) 2 [min
j ;max
j ];8rA 2 [0;1]:
(2) We now show that Alice's expected payo after receiving any signal ai is uniquely
maximized by reporting rA = Pr(Y ).
We divide the range [0;1] of rA into 3 subsets and analyze the properties of uai(rA) on
these subsets.
(a) rA 2 [maxjfmin
j g;minjfmax
j g];
(b) rA 2 [0;minjfmin
j g) [ (maxjfmax
j g;1];
(c) rA 2 [minjfmin
j g;maxjfmin
j g) [ (minjfmax
j g;maxjfmax
j g];
As long as maxjfmin
j g < minjfmax
j g, the subsets are well-dened. This is true since
we can show below that fj(Pr(Y )) = Pr(Y jbj) 2 (min
j ;max
j ).
Pr(Y jbj) =
X
ai
Pr(Y jai;bj)Pr(aijbj) 
X
ai
max
j Pr(aijbj) = max
j
Pr(Y jbj) =
X
ai
Pr(Y jai;bj)Pr(aijbj) 
X
ai
min
j Pr(aijbj) = min
j
Note that fj(rA) is increasing in rA 2 [0;1], 8j. So
min
j < Pr(Y ) < max
j ;8j:
It implies
max
j
fmin
j g < Pr(Y ) < min
j
fmax
j g:
(a) For case (a), we show below that for all rA 2 [maxjfmin
j g;minjfmax
j g], Alice's
expected payo after receiving any signal ai is uniquely maximized at rA = Pr(Y ).
By denition of xbj(rA), we have that
xbj(rA) = fj(rA);8j;8rA 2 [max
j
fmin
j g;min
j
fmax
j g]:
Alice's expected payo uai(rA) after receiving the ai signal is given by
uai(rA) =
X
j

Pr(Y;bjjai)

log
rA
r0 + log
Pr(Y jai;bj)
xbj(rA)

+Pr(N;bjjai)

log
1   rA
1   r0 + log
Pr(Njai;bj)
1   xbj(rA)

The rst derivative of Alice's expected payo after receiving the ai signal evaluated
at rA = Pr(Y ) is 0, as shown below:
duai(rA)
drA
=
P
j xbj(rA)Pr(bj)   rA
rA(1   rA)
)
duai(rA)
drA
jrA=Pr(Y ) = 0 (18)
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The second derivative of uai(rA) with respect to rA is
d2uai(rA)
dr2
A
=  
P
j(xbj(rA)   rA)2Pr(bj)
r2
A(1   rA)2 < 0
Note that the case
d
2uai(rA)
dr2
A
= 0 is ruled out because it implies xbj(rA) = rA;8j
which violates the informativeness condition.
Since
d
2uai(rA)
dr2
A
< 0,
duai(rA)
drA is strictly decreasing. Together with
duai(rA)
drA jrA=Pr(Y ) = 0, we conclude that
duai(rA)
drA > 0 for rA 2 [maxjfmin
j g;Pr(Y )],
and
duai(rA)
drA < 0 for rA 2 [Pr(Y );minjfmax
j g]. Therefore, uai(rA) is increasing for
rA 2 [maxjfmin
j g;Pr(Y )] and decreasing for rA 2 [Pr(Y );minjfmax
j g]. Moreover,
uai(rA) is uniquely maximized at rA = Pr(Y ).
Note that the above argument applies for any rA 2 (0;1) as long as we substitute in
xbj(rA) = fj(rA). Therefore, by equation (18), we can derive the following inequality
which will be useful in the rest of the proof.
X
j
fj(rA)Pr(bj)   rA > 0;8rA 2 (0;Pr(Y )) (19)
(b) For case (b), we show that uai(rA) is monotonically increasing for all rA 2
[0;minjfmin
j g). We omit the symmetric argument that can be used to show that
uai(rA) is monotonically decreasing for all rA 2 (maxjfmax
j g;1].
We dene min = minaifPr(Y jai)g and note that min 2 (0;Pr(Y )) since
Pr(Y ) =
X
i
Pr(ai)Pr(Y jai) > min
ai
fPr(Y jai)g
We rst prove that minjfmin
j g  min. To derive a contradiction, we assume
min
j > min;8j and min = Pr(Y jat) without loss of generality. Since fj(r) is
strictly increasing and min
j > min;8j, we have min
j > fj(min);8j. So we can
show that
min = Pr(Y jat) =
X
j
Pr(bj)Pr(Y jat;bj) 
X
j
Pr(bj)min
j >
X
j
Pr(bj)fj(min);
which contradicts equation (19) for rA = min. Therefore, we must have
minjfmin
j g  min.
For rA < minjfmin
j g, xbj(rA) is constant for all j. So the rst derivative of uai(rA)
with respect to rA is
duai(rA)
drA
=
Pr(Y jai)   rA
rA(1   rA)

min   rA
rA(1   rA)
>
minjfmin
j g   rA
rA(1   rA)
> 0
Therefore, uai(rA) is monotonically increasing for rA 2 [0;minjfmin
j g).
(c) For case (c), we show that uai(rA) is monotonically increasing for all
rA 2 [minjfmin
j g;maxjfmin
j g). We omit the symmetric argument which
can be used to show that uai(rA) is monotonically decreasing for all rA 2
(minjfmax
j g;maxjfmax
j g].
Without loss of generality, we assume that min
j follows the increasing order, i.e.
min
1  :::  min
n . For k 2 f1;:::;n   1g, if rA 2 [min
k ;min
k+1), then xj(rA) =
fj(rA);8j = 1;:::;k and xj(rA) = fj(min
j ) = min
j ;8j = k + 1;:::;n. Then we
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have
duai(rA)
drA
=
Pr(Y jai)   rA +
Pk
j=1 fPr(bj)fj(rA)   Pr(Y;bjjai)g
rA(1   rA)
=
Pn
j=k+1 Pr(Y;bjjai) +
Pk
j=1 Pr(bj)fj(rA)   rA
rA(1   rA)
=
Pn
j=k+1 fPr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bj)fj(rA)g
rA(1   rA)
+
Pn
j=1 Pr(bj)fj(rA)   rA
rA(1   rA)
>
Pn
j=k+1

Pr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bj)min
j
	
rA(1   rA)

Pn
j=k+1 fPr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bj)Pr(Y jai;bj)g
rA(1   rA)
=0
where the rst inequality was derived by equation (19).
In conclusion, Bob's strategy is valid and Alice's expected payo uai(r) is increasing in
[0;Pr(Y )], decreasing in [Pr(Y );1], and uniquely maximized at rA = Pr(Y ). Therefore, the
specied strategies for Alice and Bob form a PBE of the 3-stage I game.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. At a PBE of the nite-stage I game, suppose that rk and k are the report and
the strategy of the player in stage k, and suppose that for a particular k, the consistency
condition given in equation (20) below is violated.
Pr(Y jr1;:::;rk;1;:::;k) = rk (20)
Then we construct a perturbed strategy ^ k satisfying the consistency condition, and we
show that the player's expected payo by using the perturbed strategy ^ k is greater than
her expected payo by using the original strategy k.
To construct the perturbed strategy ^ k, we start by setting ^ k = k. Let x 2 [0;1] be
a point in the support of strategy k such that the consistency condition fails for x, i.e.
Pr(! = Y jr1;:::;rk 1;x;1;:::;k) 6= x. Let ^ x = Pr(! = Y jr1;:::;rk 1;x;1;:::;k). Then,
whenever the strategy k dictates that the player change the market probability to x, let
the strategy ^ k dictate that the player change the market probability to ^ x. We repeat
this perturbation for each x in the support of strategy k such that x 6= ^ x. By using this
perturbation, the strategy ^ k satises the consistency condition.
Next, we show that the player's expected payo by using the perturbed strategy ^ k
is greater than her expected payo by using her original strategy k. Let xk and ^ xk be
the random variables that correspond to the values that the player of stage k the market
probability to, and let x and ^ x be their realizations. Note that any x has a corresponding
value of ^ x, so we may write expressions like
P
x ^ x in which ^ x is implicitly indexed by x.
The dierence between the player's expected payo by using strategy ^ k and k is
X
z;r1;:::;rk 1;x
Pr(z;r1;:::;rk 1;x)
 
logPr(zjr1;:::;rk 1; ^ x)   logx

=
X
r1;:::;rk 1;x
Pr(r1;:::;rk 1;x)
X
z
Pr(zjr1;:::;rk 1;x)(log ^ x   logx)
=
X
r1;:::;rk 1;x
Pr(r1;:::;rk 1;x)
X
z
^ x(log ^ x   logx)
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=
X
r1;:::;rk 1;x
Pr(r1;:::;rk 1;x)D(p(^ xk)jjp(xk))
where p(^ xk) and p(xk) are the probability distributions of ^ xk and xk respectively.
D(p(^ xk)jjp(xk)) is relative entropy, which is nonnegative and strictly positive when the two
distributions are not the same. Since k does not satisfy the consistency condition, there
is at least one x such that Pr(x) > 0 and ^ x = x. Thus we have D(p(^ xk)jjp(xk)) > 0, and
this contradicts our assumption that k is an PBE strategy for the player of stage k of the
nite-stage I game.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof. Recall that m is the last player of the game, and tm is the last stage of the
game. Also, stage k is the second to last stage of participation for player m (k < tm).
Consider the part of the nite-stage I game starting from stage k to stage tm. There must
exist at least one player j < m whose last stage of participation is between stage k and
stage tm. We combine the players participating after stage k and before stage tm as one
composite player, and also combine their signals to be one composite signal. Because all
the signals are independent, the signal of this composite player is also independent of the
signal of player m. Therefore, we can treat the part of the nite-stage I game from stage k
to stage tm as a 3-stage I game where player m is Alice and the composite player is Bob.
By the distinguishability condition, at every PBE, information is fully aggregated at the
same of the nite-stage I game. Thus, at any PBE of this 3-stage I game, the total expected
payo of players is constant given the market estimate at the beginning of stage k and
the prior distribution. Thus, player m seeks to minimize the total expected payo of the
composite player. By Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, there exists a PBE of this 3-stage I game. At
any PBE of this game, in stage k, player m changes the market probabilities to the prior
probability of the event at the beginning of stage k. Since player m is a Bayesian agent, he
can condition his belief of the probability of the event on the strategies and the reports of
all participants in the previous stages. Thus, at the beginning of stage k, player m believes
the prior probabilities of the event to be
Pr(Y jr1;:::;rk 1;1;:::;k 1):
where r1;:::;rk 1 and 1;:::;k 1 are the reports and the strategies of the participants
in the rst k   1 stages. By Lemma 4.3, at any PBE, the strategies and reports of all
participants must satisfy the consistency condition. Thus, we must have
Pr(Y jr1;:::;rk 1;1;:::;k 1) = rk 1:
Therefore, player m's report rk 1 in stage k is equal to the market estimate immediately
before stage k. This means that player m does not change the market estimate in stage k
of the game at any PBE.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. First, we exclude degenerate cases by assuming that, if a player participates in
any number of consecutive stages in this game, then these stages are combined into one stage
for the player. This does not aect the players' strategic behaviors in this game because
the player's total payo in these consecutive stages only depends on the market estimate
at the beginning of the rst stage in this sequence, the market estimate at the end of the
last stage in this sequence, and the realized outcome of the event.
By Lemma 4.3, at any PBE of this game, the strategy of each participant must satisfy
the consistency condition.
PBE Strategy of Player m
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We rst consider player m, who is also the last participant of the game. Stage tm must be
the last stage of the game. By properties of LMSR, player m truthfully reveals his realized
signal in stage tm.
Let t denote the second to last stage of participation for player m. Consider the game
starting from stage t to stage tm. By Lemma 4.4, player m does not change the market
probability in stage t. Let t denote the new second to last stage of participation for player
m. Consider the game starting from stage t to stage tm. Player m does not participate in
any stage in between stages t and tm. By Lemma 4.4, player m does not change the market
estimate in stage t. Inferring recursively, we can show that, in any stage from stage 1 to
stage tm   1 in which player m is scheduled to participate, player m does not change the
market estimate in any of these stages.
In summary, from stage 1 to stage tm   1, player m does not participate in the game. In
stage tm, player m truthfully reveals his private signal.
PBE Strategy of Player i, 2  i  m   1
Consider player m   1. By properties of the LMSR, player m   1 truthfully reveals his
signal in stage tm 1.
From stage tm 2 + 1 to tm 1   1, by previous argument, player m does not participate
in any of these stages. Also, by the way in which players are ordered, any player i where
i < m   1 already nished their participation in the game by the end of stage tm 2. Thus,
player m   1 is the only participant from stage tm 2 + 1 to stage tm 1   1 in this game.
Thus, for these stages, if player m   1 is scheduled to participate, he may use any strategy
as long as the strategy satises the consistency condition.
Next, consider stage 1 to stage tm 2. Since player m 1 is the only participant from stage
tm 2 + 1 to stage tm 1   1, we can combine these stages as stage t and call it the new
last stage of participation for player m   1. Let stage t be the new second to last stage of
participation for player m   1. Note that we must have k < tm 2. Consider the game from
stage t to stage t. By Lemma 4.4, player m   1 does not change the market estimate in
stage t. Inferring recursively, we can show that, for any stage before tm 2 in which player
m   1 is scheduled to participate, player m   1 does not participate in any stage in the
game.
Using the same argument, we can summarize the strategy of player i, for any 2  i  m 1,
as follows: From stage 1 to stage ti 1   1, player i does not participate in the game. From
stage ti 1 + 1 to ti   1, player i uses any strategy that satises the consistency condition.
In stage ti, player i truthfully reveals his private information.
PBE Strategy of Player 1
By properties of LMSR, player 1 truthfully reveals his signal in stage t1. By our arguments
above, from stage 1 to the stage t1   1, none of the other players participates in any stage
of the game. Thus, player 1 is the only participant from stage 1 to stage t1  1 and he may
use any strategy that satises the consistency condition.
A.6. Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. This proof has 3 main steps
(1) First, we study the function uai(r) dened in equation (12) and prove that it has
the following property: For any r 2 [minifPr(Y jai)g;maxifPr(Y jai)g],
u
0
ai(r)
(Pr(Y jai) r) is
independent of the value of ai.
(2) Next, by using the above property of uai(r), we show that there does not exist a PBE
of the 3-stage D game where Alice's strategy satises
9r1;r2 2 [min
i
fPr(Y jai)g;max
i
fPr(Y jai)g];r1 6= r2 s.t. ai(r1) > 0;ai(r2) > 0;8i = 0;1
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(3) Finally, we show that if there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game, Alice must play one
of the three strategies described in the theorem.
Step 1: First, we study the function uai(r) dened in equation (12) and prove that it has
the following property: For any r 2 [minifPr(Y jai)g;maxifPr(Y jai)g],
u
0
ai(r)
(Pr(Y jai) r) is the
same function regardless of the value of ai.
By equation (12), the rst derivative of uai(r) with respect to Alice's rst-stage report r
can be calculated as follows.
u0
ai(r) =
Pr(Y jai)   r
r(1   r)
 
X
j
(
(Pr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bjjai)xbj(r))x0
bj(r)
xbj(r)(1   xbj(r))
)
We would like to compare the expression of u0
ai(r) for i = 0 and i = 1.
First, we calculate the expressions of xbj(r), 1   xbj(r), x0
bj(r) and Pr(Y;bjjai)  
Pr(bjjai)xbj(r), and they are as follows:
xbj(r) =
[Pr(Y;a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(Y;a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(Y;a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(Y;a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]
[Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]
1   xbj(r) =
[Pr(N;a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(N;a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(N;a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(N;a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]
[Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]
x
0
bj(r) =
(Pr(Y ja0;bj)   Pr(Y ja1;bj))Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)Pr(a1)(Pr(Y ja0)   Pr(Y ja1))
[Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]2
Pr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bjjai)xbj(r)
=(Pr(Y jai)   r)
Pr(bj)Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1jbj)(Pr(Y ja0;bj)   Pr(Y ja1;bj))
[Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]
To simplify the expression of u0
ai(r), let nu(f(x)) and de(f(x)) denote the numerator and
the denominator of the function f(x) where f(x) is xbj(r), 1 xbj(r), x0
bj(r) or Pr(Y;bjjai) 
Pr(bjjai)xbj(r). Notice that:
de(xbj(r)) = de(1 xbj(r)) = de(Pr(Y;bjjai) Pr(bjjai)xbj(r));

de(xbj(r))
	2
= de(x0
bj(r)):
Then the expression of u0
ai(r) can be re-written as:
u
0
ai(r) = (Pr(Y jai)   r)
1
r(1   r)
 
X
j
8
> > <
> > :
(Pr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bjjai)xbj(r))
nu(x0
bj
(r))
de(x0
bj
(r))
nu(xbj (r))
de(xbj (r))
nu(1 xbj (r))
de(1 xbj (r))
9
> > =
> > ;
= (Pr(Y jai)   r)
 
1
r(1   r)
 
X
j
(
(Pr(Y;bjjai)   Pr(bjjai)xbj(r))nu(x
0
bj(r))
(Pr(Y jai)   r)nu(xbj(r))nu(1   xbj(r))
)!
Note that the expressions of
(Pr(Y;bjjai) Pr(bjjai)xbj(r))
(Pr(Y jai) r) , nu(x0
bj(r)), nu(xbj(r)), and nu(1 
xbj(r)) do not depend on the value of ai. So
u
0
ai(r)
(Pr(Y jai) r) is not a function of ai and only a
function of r. Thus,
u
0
a0(r)
(Pr(Y ja0) r) and
u
0
a1(r)
(Pr(Y ja1) r) are the same function, and this function
is independent of the value of ai, for any r 2 [Pr(Y ja0);Pr(Y ja1)].
Step 2: Next, we prove the statement by contradiction. If the specied mixed strategy for
Alice is part of a PBE of the 3-stage D game, then by denition of a mixed strategy PBE,
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a necessary condition for Alice's strategy to be part of this PBE is
uai(r1) = uai(r2);8i = 0;1
In step 1, we shoed that the expression of u0
ai(r) can be written as follows:
u0
ai(r) = (Pr(Y jai)   r)f(r);8i = 0;1
=)
Z r
 1
u0
ai(r0)dr0 = Pr(Y jai)
Z r
 1
f(r0)dr0  
Z r
 1
r0f(r0)dr0;8i = 0;1 (21)
For convenience, we dene g(r) and h(r) below:
g(r) =
Z r
 1
f(r0)dr0
h(r) =
Z r
 1
rf(r0)dr0
From equation (21), we have
uai(r) = Pr(Y jai)g(r)   h(r) + Ci;8i = 0;1
where Ci for i = 0;1 is a constant.
By our assumption, we have
uai(r1) = uai(r2);8i = 0;1
=)Pr(Y jai)g(r1)   h(r1) + Ci = Pr(Y jai)g(r2)   h(r2) + Ci;8i = 0;1
=)Pr(Y jai) =
h(r2)   h(r1)
g(r2)   g(r1)
;8i = 0;1
=)Pr(Y ja0) = Pr(Y ja1)
The above equation Pr(Y ja0) = Pr(Y ja1) contradicts with the distinguishability condition.
Therefore, the specied mixed strategy for Alice cannot be part of a PBE of the 3-stage D
game.
Step 3: By the above arguments, there are four types of strategies that can possible be
PBE strategies for Alice in the 3-stage D game. We discuss these four types of strategies
separately:
(1) The truthful strategy is a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage D game, as
stated in the theorem.
(2) The delaying strategy is a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage D game, as
stated in the theorem.
(3) The third type of strategy is the mixed strategy given by (13) where r 6= Pr(Y ).
For a PBE strategy to be dened by equation (13) where r 6= Pr(Y ), there are some
necessary conditions that the strategy needs to satisfy. We check that these necessary
conditions are satised. Let um(r) denote Alice's ex-ante expected payo by using the
mixed strategy given in equation (13) in the rst stage of a PBE of the 3-stage D game.
Let r = argmaxr um(r);r 2 (minifPr(Y jai)g;Pr(Y )) [ (Pr(Y );maxifPr(Y jai)g).
For the strategy in equation (13) to be a PBE strategy for Alice in this game, a necessary
condition is that uai(Pr(Y jai)) = uai(r). Below, we show that this necessary condition
is satised. Formally, we will show that
u0
m(r) = 0 ) uai(Pr(Y jai)) = uai(r)
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The expression of um(r) can be written as follows:
um(r) = Pr(ai)

1  
Pr(a1 i)(r   Pr(Y ja1 i))
Pr(ai)(Pr(Y jai)   r)

uai(Pr(Y jai))
+ Pr(ai)
Pr(a1 i)(r   Pr(Y ja1 i))
Pr(ai)(Pr(Y jai)   r)
uai(r) + Pr(a1 i)ua1 i(r)
) u0
m(r) = Pr(a1 i)(Pr(Y jai)   Pr(Y ja1 i))
uai(r)   uai(Pr(Y jai))
(Pr(Y jai)   r)2
By the distinguishability condition, we know that Pr(Y jai) Pr(Y ja1 i) 6= 0. Therefore,
we have
u0
m(r) = 0 ) uai(r)   uai(Pr(Y jai)) = 0
(4) The nal type of strategy is the mixed strategy dened by the following equation:
9!r 2 (Pr(Y ja0);Pr(Y ja1));p 2 (0;1);q 2 (0;1);
s.t. a0(Pr(Y ja0)) = 1   p;a0(r) = p;a1(r) = q;a1(Pr(Y ja1)) = 1   q (22)
For this mixed strategy, we observe that, if Alice uses this strategy in a PBE of the
3-stage D game, then there must also exist a PBE of where Alice uses the truthful
strategy in the rst stage. So we include this mixed strategy as a special case when the
truthful PBE exists for this game.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. To show that Alice's strategy and Bob's strategy form a PBE of the 3-stage D
game, we need to prove 3 things below.
| First, we need to show that Bob's belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice's
strategy using Bayes' rule.
If Alice reports Pr(Y jai) in the rst stage, then Bob's belief should assign probability
1 to Alice's signal ai. Thus, Bob strategy must be to change the market probability
to Pr(Y jai;bj) in the second stage if he receives bj signal. By denition of xbj(r) in
equation (14), we can easily check that
xbj(Pr(Y jai)) = Pr(Y jai;bj)
This means that Bob's belief satises this requirement.
| Next, We need to show that Bob's belief is valid, i.e. xbj(r) 2
[minaifPr(Y jai;bjg;maxaifPr(Y jai;bjg];8bj.
First notice that xbj(r) is monotonic in r since the sign of xbj(r) remains the same for
any r 2 [minaifPr(Y jaig;maxaifPr(Y jaig].
x
0
bj(r) =
(Pr(Y ja0;bj)   Pr(Y ja1;bj))Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)Pr(a1)(Pr(Y ja0)   Pr(Y ja1))
[Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0)]r + [Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1)]2
Thus, xbj(r) achieves its maximum and minimum at r = Pr(Y jai). So we just need
to check the value of xbj(Pr(Y jai)) 2 [minaifPr(Y jai;bjg;maxaifPr(Y jai;bjg;8i = 0;1.
From the argument above, we have xbj(Pr(Y jai)) = Pr(Y jai;bj) and it's within the
specied range. Thus, Bob's belief is valid.
| Finally, we need to prove that given Bob's strategy in the second stage, Alice maximizes
her total expected payo by reporting Pr(Y jai) when she receives the ai signal. When
Alice receives the signal ai and reports r, her total expected payo is given by uai(r).
By our assumption, uai(r) is monotonically decreasing as r changes from Pr(Y jai) to
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Pr(Y ja1 i). Thus, when Alice receives the ai signal, her total expected payo is uniquely
maximized by reporting Pr(Y jai).
B. OMITTED DERIVATIONS
B.1. Derivation for the expression of uai(r)
Let  be Alice's rst-stage strategy in any PBE of the 3-stage D game and let r be any
report in the support of . Since  and r satisfy the consistency condition, we must have
Pr(Y jr;) = r
)
Pr(Y ja0)a0(r)Pr(a0) + Pr(Y ja1)a1(r)Pr(a1)
Pr(a0)a0(r) + Pr(a1)a1(r)
= r
)a0(r)Pr(a0)(Pr(Y ja0)   r) = a1(r)Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1)) (23)
By the consistency condition, it's easy to see that r 2
[minaifPr(Y jai)g;maxaifPr(Y jai)g].
By equation (23), we have
a0(r)Pr(a0)(Pr(Y ja0)   r) + a0(r)Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
= a0(r)Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1)) + a1(r)Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
)a0(r)(Pr(a0)(Pr(Y ja0)   r) + Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1)))
= (a0(r) + a1(r))Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
)
a0(r)
a0(r) + a1(r)
=
Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
Pr(a0)(Pr(Y ja0)   r) + Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
(24)
At any PBE, Bob's belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice's strategy by
using the Bayes' rule. Since Alice only has 2 realized signals, it suces to specify r;bj(a0)
since r;bj(a1) = 1   r;bj(a0). Bob's belief can be derived as follows:
r;bj(a0) =
Pr(a0;rjbj)
Pr(rjbj)
=
Pr(a0jbj)a0(r)
Pr(a0jbj)a0(r) + Pr(a1jbj)a1(r)
(25)
Taking equation (24) and plugging into equation (25), we have
r;bj(a0) =
Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)(r   Pr(Y ja1))
(Pr(a0jbj)Pr(a1)   Pr(a1jbj)Pr(a0))r + (Pr(a1jbj)Pr(Y;a0)   Pr(a0jbj)Pr(Y;a1))
(26)
At any PBE, Bob's strategy xbj(r) is fully determined given Bob's belief, Bob's signal,
and Alice's report, as follows:
xbj(r) = Pr(Y jr;bj) = r;bj(a0)Pr(Y ja0;bj) + (1   r;bj(a0))Pr(Y ja1;bj) (27)
Plugging the expression of Bob's belief (26) into the denition of Bob's strategy (27), we
have
xbj(r) =
Pr(Y;bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(Y;bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))
Pr(bjja0)(Pr(Y ja1)   r) + Pr(bjja1)(r   Pr(Y ja0))
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Finally, we can write down the expression of uai(r) as follows.
uai(r) =Pr(Y jai)log
r
Pr(Y )
+ Pr(Njai)log
1   r
1   Pr(Y )
+
X
j

Pr(Y;bjjai)log
Pr(Y jai;bj)
xbj(r)
+ Pr(N;bjjai)log
Pr(Njai;bj)
1   xbj(r)

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